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June, 1961



SOME MISCONCEPTIONS  
ABOUT WOMEN IN AFRICA

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Photo by Vic Casamento  
The Washington Post

# Africa Report

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## COVER PHOTO:

Mrs. C. C. Uchuno, wife of the Second Secretary of the Nigerian Embassy, with Mrs. James Symington at the May reception of Neighbors, Inc., in Washington, DC.

## In This Issue

### Articles

What Cards Does Gizenga Hold?	2
Four African Views of the Congo Crisis	3
The Monrovia Conference	5
Some Misconceptions About African Women	7

### Departments

News Review	10
Books	13
Economic Notes	9

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## What Cards Does Gizenga Hold?

By HENRY TANNER\*

The greatest strength of Antoine Gizenga lies in the fact that he has made greater headway than anybody else in the Congo toward building an effective political machine, a tightly organized authoritarian regime along the lines of President Sékou Touré's Marxist-inspired one-party system in Guinea.

Competent observers recently returned from Stanleyville believe that the Gizenga regime is a going concern, that it has more control over its soldiers and its population than the central government has in its area. The same observers believe that the recently lifted economic blockade of Stanleyville by the Leopoldville Government inflicted heavy damage on the remaining Belgian and other European interests, but did not seriously affect the African population or the political fortunes of the regime.

### Bloc Support Minimal

Internationally, Mr. Gizenga has the support of the Eastern bloc and of the members of the Casablanca Group, which consists of the five most aggressively nationalistic African powers—Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic.

Since the early days of Mr. Gizenga's regime, before Mr. Lumumba's death last January, when Soviet planes were reported to have dropped arms to Stanleyville, Western observers have noticed no substantial material assistance coming from any of these quarters.

### Congo Too Remote

One of the reasons why there has not been more material assistance presumably is that the Casablanca Group, like everybody else, likes to back a winner and that the chances of a Gizenga victory are strictly limited.

As for the Soviet bloc, the Congo's place on the world map is so remote from any Communist-controlled territory that a Korean type of operation is just not in the cards, in the view of Western specialists.

In spite of the consolidation of his political organization, Mr. Gizenga's power is not unchallenged. He has been feuding for many months with the Provincial Government of Orientale Province, of which Stanleyville is the capital. In Kivu, the second province under nominal Gizenga control, there has been such confusion lately

that United Nations officials have simply refused to speculate who might be the effective head of the local government.

Then there is the army. Mr. Gizenga is believed to have 6,000 to 7,000 men, compared to 8,000 soldiers under the control of the central government. A mid-May purge of moderates in the Gizenga regime included two of the highest ranking army officers among the victims.

### Army Control Incomplete

Mr. Gizenga's control of the army thus appears to be less than complete. But the purge also is evidence that the most important soldier in Orientale Province, General Victor Lunda, is firmly on Mr. Gizenga's side, in spite of frequent rumors to the contrary.

As for Parliament, Mr. Gizenga is believed to control about 30 members of the Assembly. To these must be added nine members of the Assembly who took refuge in a camp of the United Nations here after the announcement of the death of Mr. Lumumba. Nine others are known or believed to be dead or have not been heard of in months. This means that Mr. Gizenga's call for a boycott of the Parliament will be effective to the extent that at least 50 of the 137 members of the Assembly will not show up. This figure may be swelled by absenteers from other regions, notably Katanga.

For the Senate, the estimate is that a minimum of 35 out of 86 Senators will stay away, either as a result of Mr. Gizenga's orders or because of death. This figure, again, does not include potential absenteers from other regions or factions.

### Quorum Needed

According to the Basic Law that remains the Congo's Constitution until a new one is adopted, two-thirds of the membership of both Chambers must be present to make a quorum when the elaboration of a new Constitution is at stake. The central government thus will have to work hard to get a quorum.

## Opposition Leaders Freed in Sierra Leone

The last of 43 detained leaders of the opposition All People's Congress Party were released on May 20 by the government of Sierra Leone. All had been arrested shortly before independence was proclaimed April 27 on charges that they were planning to disrupt the celebrations and carry out sabotage "with aid from outside the country."

\* This analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Stanleyville regime of Antoine Gizenga was originally written for the New York Times and is reprinted here (slightly abbreviated) with permission. Mr. Tanner is the Times correspondent in the Congo.

# Four African Views Of the Congo Crisis

ROBERT C. GOOD\*

Mario Cardoso, the Congo's representative at the UN, once complained that Western capitalism had provoked Katanga's secession, while Communism had fomented the secession of Orientale. "It is not the Congolese that are divided, it is the world that is divided. Therefore, leave the Congo alone . . ." There is enough truth in this plea to make it poignant. But it is a half-truth. The other half relates, of course, to the perfectly obvious dissensions among the principal actors in the Congo—and just as important, among the African states.

A review of UN debates and recent African conferences discloses three clusters of African attitudes concerning the Congo. For want of better labels, it has become customary to call their exponents "radicals" (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the UAR), "conservatives" (the former sub-Saharan French states excluding Senegal, Mali and Togo) and "moderates" (Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia, Somalia and the Sudan).

## Who is the Enemy?

The basic issues in the Congo crisis, around which these attitudes have formed, are four: Who is the "enemy"? What is the Congo? What role for the UN? And what about the problem of unilateral aid—or intervention, depending on one's point of view?

One or two warning flags must be posted immediately. The following summary represents broad positions. Differences within each camp, admittedly important, are not adequately explored. Also, each position represents an orientation that obviously affects, but does not preclude, tactical maneuver. Moreover, we are examining "declaratory policies" which are often exaggerated for impact. Still, within these limitations, the follow-

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This article is an abbreviated version of the conclusions reached in "Congo Crisis: The Role of the New States," to be published shortly by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

ing survey does illustrate broad differences in African analyses of the Congo crisis. These differences, I think, reflect some of the forces that will help shape political developments on the continent in the opening years of the postcolonial era.

## I. The Radicals

To understand the position of the radicals concerning the Congo, and African developments in general, one must first understand the word "neo-colonialism"—for a complete world view attaches to it. In the radical ideology concerning neo-colonialism, there are three tenets that especially concern us. The first is the notion of "pseudo-independence," or what Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah has called "clientele-sovereignty." This, he explained, is "the practice of granting a sort of independence by the metropolitan power, with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a client-state and controlling it effectively by means other than political ones."

The second tenet is capsulated in the term "Balkanization," which the radicals believe is the basic strategy of neo-colonialists for maintaining pseudo-independent regimes. The colonial power fragments an area—the Congo, for example—into a number of small states. None is viable, so all must remain "clients" of the former mother country. Balkanization is practiced not only on a country basis, but regionally and even continentally to divide the new states from one another. "We know the objectives of the West," Lumumba once said. "Yesterday it divided us at the level of tribes, clans, and chiefs. Today—because Africa is freeing itself—it wishes to divide us on the level of states. It wishes to create antagonistic blocs and satellites and from that state of cold war accentuate the divisions with a view to maintaining its eternal trusteeship." If the African bloc has been fractured, it is the result, not of genuine, internal divisions, but of "sabotage" carried on by the colonial powers in order to wreck African "solidarity."

In the radical view, the saboteurs have accomplices recruited from the colonized population. These are the "stooges" of the imperialist powers. A third tenet of the radical view deals with this "enemy within." Often, he

- *The Radicals*
- *The Conservatives*
- *The Moderates*
- *Deviant Ghana*

is an unwitting puppet, the victim of a colonially-corrupted mind. After a bitter exchange in the Security Council, the delegate from Guinea said to his opposite number from the former French Congo: "... it is with great sadness that I have listened to the man that I ... call my brother—sadness to see to what point colonization can change the very nature of the colonized. . . ." Whether knowingly or unwittingly, the stooge or the puppet is the instrument of the neo-colonialists; he is the enemy within the gate. He was Bao Dai in Vietnam, Baccouche in Tunisia, El-Glaoui in Morocco, and now Tshombe, or Mobutu, or perhaps even Kasavubu in the Congo.

## The Neo-Colonialist Threat

Neo-colonialism is the "enemy". From this notion, the radical's position on the other issues follows logically. Thus, the proper definition of the Congo: it is an embryonic state threatened with extinction by the Belgians and their neo-colonialist allies who have "set Congolese fighting Congolese."

To void the imperialist's plot demands rapid consolidation against every attempt at Balkanization. "... let me assure you that Tshombes do not exist in Mali," the delegate from that country told the Security Council. It demands decisive reduction of reliance on the former metropole, for a foreign-controlled economy means domination every bit as effective as outright political control. It demands the unity of the postcolonial states ("pan-Africanism"), not just because there resides in unity that strength which is the only ultimate answer to imperialist designs, but also because a setback anywhere along the nationalists' front line may cause a breakthrough of neo-colonialist forces which would utterly overwhelm the fragile new states. This is why the neo-colonialist assault on the Congo must be defeated conclusively, for if it succeeds, said the delegate from Guinea, "the entire world would undoubtedly be a spectator to the destruction and breaking up of Africa to the satisfaction of the colonial Powers . . . As far as we are concerned, Guinea could well be the Congo, and the Congo, Africa . . ."

For the radicals, the legitimacy of a postcolonial regime relates in part to its legal mandate; but even more,

legitimacy relates to the regime's credentials as a representative of genuine nationalism fighting against the intrigues of neo-colonialism. This is why Lumumba was so extolled—this "best son of Africa," this "Lincoln of the Congo," this "black Messiah," whose struggle was made noble by his unswerving demand for centralism against all forms of Balkanization and rendered heroic by his unyielding resistance to the forces of neo-colonialism which finally killed his body, but not his spirit.

In this situation, the United Nations has only one possible function. It must place its resources at the disposal of the nationalist regime. The doctrine has been stated most clearly by Guinea: ". . . the United Nations must acquiesce in all requests of the [Lumumbist] Central Government . . ." That the United Nations did not do so can only be explained by the fact that the organization came under the domination of neo-colonial forces. It lost its legitimacy and became an added cause of the crisis rather than the cure. Under these circumstances the UN ought to withdraw from the Congo.

If the UN fails to thwart neo-colonialist ambitions, action must be taken outside the world organization. "We cannot be passive spectators," said the Moroccan ambassador to the United Nations, ". . . [watching] the rebirth of colonialism and its return to the Congo. . . ."

The radicals have been accused of "intervention." But intervention, which is an illicit involvement of one

sovereign state in the affairs of another, is meaningful only in the context of true international relations—relations, that is, between sovereign and equal members of international society. It is central to the radical view of African politics that no such international society now exists in Africa, nor can it come into existence until the plots of the neo-colonialists have been exposed and defeated. Rather, Africa is seen as composed of a few "beachheads" of genuine independence struggling to consolidate against an implacable foe. Surrounding these enclaves are vast areas, nominally independent to be sure, but still controlled in varying degrees by neo-colonialist forces. These are what Ismael Toure of Guinea has called "regimes of surveillance" as opposed to "regimes of pure liberty."

#### Pseudo-Independence Cited

Under Lumumba, the Congo had a fighting chance to frustrate the plots of imperialism. But the imperialists overwhelmed Lumumba. The Congo, except for Gizenga-land, came under the control of neo-colonialist forces. A state controlled by neo-colonialism is not a sovereign member of the international community at all. This being the case, one cannot speak of "intervention" in the Congo. Rather, one must speak of the continuation of the struggle of nationalism vs. colonialism on a new front. Pseudo-independence may change the form of the problem, but not the reality. On the same day (February 21, 1961) that the Security Council passed a resolution calling for "the solution of the problem of the Congo . . . without any interference from the outside"—a resolution co-sponsored by the UAR—President Nasser announced that he was giving unilateral aid to the Gizenga government in Stanleyville! This is a contradiction only to those who do not share the radical view of African politics.

The questions raised by all this are intriguing, the more so because they would appear to apply to relations between the radicals and the many "conservative" states of the former French empire. When does the post-colonial era really begin? When do the rules of the game change? Obviously the rules that obtain during the struggle for independence are one thing; the rules that govern relations between sovereign and equal members of international society are another. There is a tendency on the part of the radicals to assume that the rules do not change until Africa has established a position of strength independent of the former colonial powers; has thus annulled the plots of the neo-colonialists; and has brought into being a true pan-African State. Until that end has been reached tactics that less radical minds might condemn as intervention or subversion remain perfectly fair game.

## II. The Conservatives

Unlike the radicals, who want to upset the *status quo* in emerging Africa, the former French sub-Saharan territories (barring Guinea, Mali, and Togo) want to preserve it. Rather than disrupt the ties with the former metropole, the conservatives wish to maintain them. Instead of developing Africa as an autonomous continent, beholden to no external force, they want their states to develop, at least for the present, in close cooperation with Europe. In place of the radicals' notion that the state system inherited from the colonial era is a form of Balkanization which does not provide an adequate or even a legitimate basis for relations among true African nationalists, the conservatives insist on the legitimacy of present boundaries—again, for the present.

These conservative states have achieved independence in amity with France. For the most part they do not question the propriety of maintaining civil order and technical services with extensive French help. One supposes therefore that the animus of the radical toward the former metropole is difficult for them to comprehend. (Only Ghana among the radicals does not share this animus.)

As the conservatives' approach to the problem of organizing the post-colonial world differs markedly from that of the radicals, so too is the entire problem of the Congo structured differently for the conserva-

(Continued on page 6)



Antoine Gizenga

—Wide World



Joseph Kasavubu

—UN photo

# The Monrovia Conference

May 8-12, Monrovia, Liberia

## WHO WAS THERE:

President William V. S. Tubman of Liberia, presiding; President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast; President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun; President Leopold Senghor of Senegal; President Philibert Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic; President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo; President Hubert Maga of Dahomey; President Francois Tombalbaye of Chad; President Hamani Diori of Niger; President Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta; President Fulbert Youlou of Congo (Brazzaville); Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria; Prime Minister Sir Milton Margai of Sierra Leone; Prime Minister Abdi Rashid Shermarke of Somalia; and Prime Minister Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania. In addition, high-level delegations represented Tunisia (whose President Habib Bourghiba could not attend because he was completing state visits to the US, UK, and Canada); the Central African Republic and Gabon (whose presidents were ill); Ethiopia; and Libya.

## NOTABLE ABSENTEES:

The Presidents of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali declined to come on the grounds that preparations had been inadequate. Morocco and the United Arab Republic, the fourth and fifth Casablanca Powers, also were unrepresented. Sudan's President Ibrahim Abboud withdrew his acceptance a few days before the conference, on the grounds that he must support Morocco's objection to the insertion of a controversial issue into the meeting—i.e., the presence of Mauritania, whose independence Morocco disputes. The Congo (Leopoldville) was not invited because of the desire to avoid a controversy with the Casablanca nations over credentials.

## ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

Three major resolutions were adopted—

1. The first resolution recognized the importance of the Monrovia Conference as historic and regretted the absence of some sister states but expressed the hope the absentee states would attend the next meeting at Lagos later in 1961; established six principles to govern relationships among African states, (absolute equality irrespective of size, population and wealth, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for the sovereignty and inalienable rights of each state, unqualified condemnation of outside subversive actions by neighboring states, promotion of cooperation throughout Africa based upon tolerance, solidarity, good-neighboringness and "non-acceptance of any leadership," and unity void of political integration of sovereign African states); urged all African and Malagasy states to refrain from encouraging subversive activities by permitting use of their territory as bases from which dissidents might operate; accepted in principle the creation of an advisory organization to put into effect the principles agreed upon; decided to set up a Technical Commission of experts to meet in Dakar, Senegal within three months to work out detailed plans for economic, educational, cultural, scientific, technical, communications, and transport cooperation; urged the revival of African culture and traditions in the interest of preserving a real African heritage; and stressed the need to teach the French and

English languages in addition to the respective national and official languages.

2. A second resolution affirmed the unanimous determination of the states to give material and moral assistance to all dependent territories of colonial powers to accelerate accession to independence; appealed to France and the Algerian Provisional Government to end the war and accord independence and territorial integrity to Algeria; reaffirmed faith in the United Nations as the organization best adapted to achieve a real solution of the Congo problem; called on all African states to desist from the hasty recognition of breakaway regimes in the Congo and from taking sides with rival groups; condemned assassinations as means to attain political power as well as the action of certain non-African states which encouraged subversion; condemned unreservedly the policy of "apartheid" in South Africa and all attempts to weaken the authority of the United Nations; appealed to the universal conscience against atrocities and bloody repression of the Angolan population and to all nuclear powers to stop the manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and further explosions; called on African and Malagasy states to pledge wholehearted material and moral support to Africans in Angola, to apply pressure on South Africa to compel abandonment of "apartheid" practice, and to take all necessary steps to give material and moral support to Africans and Asians in South Africa to regain the stature of men; affirmed strong support for the decision of the Trusteeship Council that South Africa must acknowledge the authority of the Council as guardian of the Mandate over South West Africa; instructed the Chairman to make a written appeal to the Nuclear Disarmament Commission meeting in Geneva to use its best efforts to secure disarmament; and urged the United Nations to assure a more equitable distribution of seats on the Security and the Economic and Social Councils.

3. The third resolution approved the settlement of disputes between African states by peaceful means, for which purpose a Commission should be created and attached to the Organization of Cooperation of African and Malagasy States. It also recommended that a written appeal be made through the executive authority of the Conference to Their Excellencies the Emperor of Ethiopia and the President of Somalia to make renewed efforts toward a sincere and early solution of the existing frontier and any other disputes.

## DOMINANT PERSONALITIES:

Observed the *Guardian's* Hella Pick: "It was the Nigerian Prime Minister who emerged as the dominating personality. Little known so far on the wider African horizon, Sir Abubaker at last showed that he was a match for the 'sages' of the French-speaking world."

Said the *Washington Post's* African correspondent, Russell Howe: "With his innate gift for compromise, Tafawa Balewa kept in front of the conference at every stage the presence of an outside world . . . It was Tafawa Balewa, too, who convinced his colleagues they should limit their objectives to those things on which agreement would be feasible in a short top-level conference. 'It is better to do a little and to do it well than to try for the moon and never get past the garden wall,' was how one member of the Nigerian delegation summed up his philosophy."

# Four African Views of the Congo Crisis

(Continued from page 4)

tives. Belgium may be an "enemy," but for many conservatives she is not the only enemy nor even the major one.

For the conservative extremists (Cameroun and Congo-Brazzaville are the clearest examples), the real "enemy" in the Congo situation is not Western imperialism but Communism—the fountainhead of a new imperialism. Frequently these states simply take over the categories of the radicals but fill them with opposite content. It is Mr. Gizenga who is scored as a "colonialist puppet," with Soviet imperialists handling the strings. It is the radical state that suffers "independence on parole," having sold itself to the "rapacious" Communist master. While the radicals speak of the conservatives as "imperialist stooges," the conservatives refer to the radicals as "Soviet satellites," Russia's "African colonies," and "crypto-Communists." Thus does the Cold War infiltrate African squabbles despite the best intentions of the new states to keep it out.

## The "Myth" of the Congo

For the radicals' doctrinaire assertion that the Congo is, or must be made, one nation indivisible, the conservatives tend to stress its diversity. In place of the "inviolable principle" of unity, they have emphasized "reality." After recording the enormous diversity lying beneath the "myth" of the Congo, Mr. Thiam of Senegal noted how complex were the problems of achieving unity even among countries long exposed to modern life, like those of Europe. How much more difficult, then, in Africa! "We accused France of having Balkanized Africa. But who knows if we would not have found ourselves in a Congo-like situation if independence had been granted to us, not on the basis of each territory being one State, but the basis of a united territory." Added to the Senegalese sense of "reality" is French Equatorial "realism." The Congo's near-neighbors in former French Africa are hardly enthusiastic about the emergence of a unitarian Congolese state susceptible of control by a "radical" government.

Concerning the governmental crisis in the Congo, the conservatives, while proclaiming a "hands-off" attitude, have supported Kasavubu and his Prime Minister, Joseph Ileo, as the carriers of the Congolese nationalist tradition and have dismissed Lumumba as a "newcomer." When Mr. Lumumba was assassinated, the conservatives politely participated in denunciations of "political violence." Some noted, however, that the event created a greater sensation outside

the Congo than within. ". . . when a member of the family dies," said the Central African Republic delegate, ". . . wakes are organized during which people weep . . . It is improper [however] for neighbors and friends to weep more loudly than the deceased person's own relatives."

If the radicals scored the UN Congo mission because it would not intervene enough, the conservatives have criticized the world organization because it intervened too much. While acknowledging the usefulness of the UN in preventing foreign intervention in the Congo, the conservative states have stressed that the United Nations must not practice "pro-consulship" (Senegal), that it "should keep its hands clean in respect of the problems of African internal politics, which are a family matter" (Central African Republic), that it "can take no stand in the institutional crisis" (Ivory Coast), and that it must take no action tantamount to disarming the troops of a sovereign state member of the United Nations as "this would be a grave precedent indeed" (Congo-Brazzaville).

Most conservative states would probably agree with an observation made to Marguerite Higgins by a Cameroun official who drew a parallel between divisions in the Congo and the radical-supported, Bamileke rebellion in his own country: "We are lucky. Think of the terrible situation if the United Nations had ever come in here . . . they would have interposed themselves between us and the rebels, restraining us from trying to wipe them out. This would have given them a chance to consolidate themselves."

## Both Sides Obstruct UN

Of course, the radical Lumumba said much the same thing. But that is just the point. Both the radicals and the conservatives have lined up against the UN. Both have said that the UN should get out of the Congo, or at least be restricted to a minimal role. The difference between radical and conservative denunciations of the UN Congo Mission is this: the radicals are against the world organization because they believe it defends a wholly unsatisfactory *status quo*; the conservatives are hesitant about the UN because they believe it may act to upset a *status quo* that will permit a slow movement toward a settlement favorable to conservative interests. ". . . it is necessary . . . to wait patiently until the obstacles are overcome one by one," said Malagasy's Louis Rakotomalala, capturing the conservative mood nicely. External intervention, whether unilateral or multilateral, would only complicate the process. This is one of the reasons

why Mr. Thiam of Senegal has called the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states "the Golden Rule of international relations."

## III. The Moderates

The African "moderates" are the in-between group—whether for historical, ideological, or political reasons. Historically, Ethiopia and Liberia have remained aloof, though admittedly that is changing rapidly. For reasons of ideology, French-speaking Tunisia and Togo cannot identify with the French-speaking conservative groups; nor can the Sudan and Somalia for historical reasons. At the same time, political considerations (and possibly ideological ones as well) prompt Tunisia, Togo and the Sudan to keep their distance from the radicals. Togo's delicate relationship to Ghana demands this, as do the relationships of Tunisia and the Sudan to the UAR. Somalia has not as yet been drawn into the larger African arena mainly because its border problem with Ethiopia is its preoccupation. Nigeria is self-possessed, content with its size and its potential, and intent thus far on playing an independent role. Libya, like Morocco, is radical in its diplomatic discourse, but conservative at home. There is a tendency to reflect the UAR line, but Libya, unlike Morocco with its claim to Mauritania, has no compelling interest in sub-Saharan politics.

As compared with the two extremes, there is less emotional content to the judgments of the moderates about the Congo and greater inclination to deal with the problem in terms of institutions and procedures rather than personalities and symbols. For the moderates, the problem of achieving order in the Congo presses slightly more heavily than does the concern to establish this group in power or prevent that group from ascendancy. The foregoing are not bald distinctions; they are nuances, but important nonetheless.

For the extreme radical and the extreme conservative, the "enemy" in the Congo crisis has been defined simply—neo-colonialism in the one case and Communism in the other. The moderates, though there are great variations among them, tend to acknowledge that the situation is complex. Most moderates would agree with Tunisia's Foreign Minister Mongi Slim who, in apportioning blame, cited not only the Belgians who "promote hostility and sow the seeds of division" in the Congo, but also the "personal ambitions" and "regional interests" of the Congolese political leaders themselves. Insofar

(Continued on page 12)



# Some Misconceptions About Women in Africa

By MAI PADMORE\*

In November 1959, I had the privilege of participating in the first United States conference on the Role of Women in Africa. The conclusions reached by this conference were that the franchise, increased employment opportunities, expanding educational facilities and mass communications were influences favoring the fuller participation of African women in community life, but that factors hindering their "maximum effectiveness" were shortage of trained leadership, the conservative forces of traditional society, low health standards, and lack of leisure.

What struck me about these conclusions, issued in a press release after the conference, was that they can, with perhaps a few minor changes, be applied to women anywhere in the world. I think the history of woman in all parts of this globe has been the same. She has been subordinate to man, in the first place, because he was the stronger sex and it was to him that the whole family looked for protection. The duty of bringing up her children and taking care of the house has deprived her of the leisure needed for any venture into politics. It is only in recent times that a general rise in living standards has conferred on woman the modicum of prosperity that is necessary if she is to be able to concern herself with problems affecting the welfare of the community in which she lives.

What I am trying to say is that the story of women in Africa is really the story of women in Europe, or in America, or in fact, anywhere, although perhaps the tempo of change in Africa has been slower than in some other areas. The scenario is the same, but the episodes are longer. The path of progress never varies in direction, but in Africa it is a little steeper. Women in the Western world, I think we can say, have been able to walk towards emancipation, whereas the women of Africa have had to climb or scramble.

Nevertheless, we should be careful of attaching too much importance to the "conservative forces of traditional society" in Africa. They are not as conservative as all that. In my own country, although ancient tribal law

supposedly held men to be superior to women, many leading women in tribal society became queens in the old days and today there are women Paramount and Clan Chiefs who have been elected by men to rule over them. Moreover, it is a mistake to assume that women in Africa received no education of any kind until white missionaries came along with their Bibles and textbooks. For centuries, girls of the hinterland tribes in Liberia have been given systematic training for citizenship in the Sande Society. Although this society is a secret, there is nothing sinister about its activities, which include the imparting of instruction in folklore, physical education, and arts and crafts.

#### Anthropologists' Terms Distort

I think few things have done more to distort the picture of African women than the language used by European anthropologists in describing the matrimonial practices that they discovered in our continent. We have a system under which girls are given in marriage by their parents, just as they are in Europe, or the United States. Indeed, your marriage ceremony calls for the presence of someone (usually the father) who "gives the bride away". In Africa, this "giving away" is done, in many cases, in return for the payment of a sum of money by the bridegroom to the girl's family. That money is recoverable if the bride misbehaves. In other words, the transaction is intended to clothe the wedding contract with legality and to establish stable relations between the two parties. It is really the old European "dowry" arrangement in reverse. But unfortunately the word "dowry" has been discarded by the scholars and in its place has been substituted the misleading phrase "bride price" which gives the impression that African women are bought and sold like chattels. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The ordinary African wife loves her husband and adores her children. She is loved and adored by them in return. Her status within the home is far from that of servitude.

But let us put tribal custom aside for the moment and come down to modern times. In most of Africa the rights of women are today spelled out in legislation which has superseded the old tribal laws. Of woman's position in Liberia, the lady who has the distinction of being the first of her sex to be elected to our National Legislature recently wrote in a magazine article:

"The legal status of women in Li-

Mrs. Mai Padmore

—City News Bureau

\* Mrs. Mai Padmore is the wife of the Liberian Ambassador to the United States. She is also a successful businesswoman, the owner-manager of a large rubber plantation, and the mother of four sons. She has just returned from a visit to Liberia, where she served as official rapporteur for the conference held in Monrovia in May of African heads-of-state. This article is based on an address which she recently gave to a Women's Guild in New Jersey.

beria poses no problem. Their emancipation is complete in every sense of the word. This emancipation is not confined to the coastal regions alone; it extends to the remotest village of the far interior—we find women who are leaders in the nation, holding positions as mayors, councillors, jurors, sub-cabinet ministers, acting cabinet ministers, consuls and secretaries in embassies overseas, post-mistresses, paramount chiefs, and so on. Many legislative measures have been introduced and inspired by women. And this activity on the whole meets with the support and approval of political parties and most of the Liberian men."

And so the bell of progress tinkles merrily. But, as in other continents, progress has left problems as well as blessings in its train. Our women have become more and more independent. Those with formal education have achieved high rank in the civil service. But the story does not end there. Even those with little or no schooling have gone into business as farmers or petty traders and in many cases have become moderately wealthy. One result of all this has been a marked weakening of the family ties which once were so invulnerable to any outside pressure. And from any loss of family discipline there must follow the hateful problem of juvenile delinquency.

#### Example Set in Welfare Work

Although there seems to be no way to avoid the temporary evils which are the price of advancement, I am confident that Liberian women will have the good sense to confront and disarm them. Already they are setting a fine example in their activities in the field of social welfare. They have financed, through their voluntary organizations, a number of orphanages, homes for the mentally ill and for old people, and even a refuge where unmarried mothers may find a way to rehabilitation. In all this, they have shown the same sense of unerring citizenship that characterized the womenfolk who were among the tiny band of settlers from the United States by which Liberia was founded nearly 140 years ago. Those pioneer wives and mothers were to a great extent the creators of Liberian unity. They realized that if the young republic was to become strong, there must be a bond of common loyalty and love between the settlers and the tribal Africans among whom they had made their home. And so those hardy, God-fearing women took tribal children to their bosoms and raised them as members of their own families, teaching them the rudiments of the civilization of the Christian world. It was in this way that those tribes which at first were unfriendly to the settlers were slowly won over to a belief in God and to a belief in Liberia. Today, thanks largely to the pacifying influence of our women, there are no longer settlers and tribespeople in my country. All of us are

Liberians, and all of us are proud to bear that name.

One hundred and thirty-five years ago the first missionaries went to Africa. Today, several thousands are there, living in all the political areas of the continent, a large percentage of them in Liberia. I wish I could tell you about the Baptists, their training school for nurses and maternity center; about the Lutherans, their hospitals and their campaign against illiteracy; about the Methodists and their work among the lepers; about the fine high schools which have been developed by the Catholics and the Seventh Day Adventists; and the High Schools, College, and Divinity School being operated by the Episcopal Church. But there is not time for me to recite the long list of achievements of these missionaries in Liberia, drawn from so many different branches of the Christian family.

#### The Tasks Ahead

The work of Christ moves forward in Africa because of the vision and faith of dedicated African and American women. More and more Christian women are becoming aware of the task that lies ahead of them. An endless chain of light and power is forged link by link in the life and service of missionary women. They realize that serious Christians must be concerned with the condition of man whatever his race or creed.

I can only emphasize that, in all this missionary effort, so far-reaching and so overwhelmingly important in the everyday life of the Republic, the women have played and are still playing and will continue to play their part.

As standards of living rise in what was once the most impoverished continent in the world, so more and more educated African women are acquiring the leisure time that can be devoted to unselfish good works as well as selfish recreation. And, by the way, let us thankfully take note of the fact that the well-to-do African wife is as eager to serve charitable causes as the well-to-do American wife. Women are the same the world over. They have an instinctive affection for the whole of humankind.

To sum up, let me say frankly that I feel that there is no separate and burning challenge to be sought in the supposed predicament of the women of Africa. They are intelligent, they are resourceful, they are respected by the male members of every generation within their own families. They are guarded in almost every part of the continent by laws which are basically not so different from those of the United States. I do not think there is any need to picture them as weak and bewildered sisters who have somehow lost their way and who cry to be rescued from the wilderness.

If I welcome the interest which the women of this country are begin-

ning to show in the women of Africa, it is because I welcome any development which will bring the women of the whole world closer together in a fellowship transcending race and color and creed. We all need help. We all need sympathy. We all need inspiration. We need to stretch out the hand of friendship to each other because we are all women, not because some of us are well to do, and some poor, or some of us highly educated and some of us illiterate.

At least we have one thing in common. We are the bearers of children. We are the custodians of the future. It is our blood which runs in a continuous stream through the ancestral tree of mankind. It is we who resent most bitterly the horrors of war, it is we who give birth to the anonymous thousands still slain yearly on the field of battle, it is we whose cry of protest will in the end drown out the drums and trumpets of the would-be conquerors. That is why I rejoice that there has come into being this quest for comradeship between women on the two sides of the Atlantic.

The women of Africa have come a long way in the march of progress, but we still have a big job to do which we can do together.

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# ECONOMIC NOTES

## "Brazzaville" Countries To Pool Air Transport

Additional economic links are being forged among the members of the Union of African States and Malagasy (see *Africa Report*, May 1961, p. 12) as a result of decisions reached at the March meeting of the "Brazzaville Twelve" at Yaounde, Cameroun. The 11 continental members (excluding Malagasy), for example, have announced the pooling of their air transport into a single system to be called *Air Afrique*, with headquarters in Abidjan. The founding members will contribute 66 percent of the capital.

Senegal's Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, in presenting his country's four year development plan, stated that it would be submitted to the other members of the Union for their approval.

## First Stage of Volta Project Is Contracted to Italian Firm

The Ghana Government announced on May 12 that the Italian Impresit group had been granted a £16,076,901 contract to construct the first stage of the Volta River Project. The contract covers the construction of the main dam, saddle dam, and power plant, from which Ghana hopes to begin to receive electricity by September 1965 (see *Africa Report*, January 1961, p. 2).

The main dam will be 2,100 feet long and 370 feet high, and the smaller dam upstream to close off a valley will be 1,200 feet long and 120 feet high. The power house, designed to take six generators, will provide 128,000 kilowatts continuous output of electricity. Plans are now being made for resettling the estimated 74,000 persons who will be displaced by the rising waters of the lake behind the dam.

The principal customer for electric power will be the VALCO aluminum smelter (see *Africa Report*, April 1961, p. 12), without which the dam would not have been feasible. Ghana hopes to put the surplus electricity into a grid (transmission network) covering much of southern Ghana, passing through Accra, Cape Coast, Takoradi, Tarkwa, Dunkwa, Kumasi, Koforidua, and back to the power plant at Akosombo. The grid would be tapped at various points for supplying power to towns and industries. Power will be sold wholesale by the Volta River Authority, a statutory company authorized by the Volta River Development Bill adopted by Ghana in April.

The winning bidder, Group Impresit-Girola-Lodigiani and E. Recchi, built the famed Kariba dam in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Unsuccessful bidders included

the Morrison-Knudsen Company of San Francisco, in association with the British firm Taylor Woodrow, and a group headed by Parkinson Howard, the British firm in charge of constructing Tema Harbor.

## US Exports to Africa Increase, But Share of Total is Small

The 1959 deficit in US trade with Africa changed to a surplus in 1960 as a result of increased exports to and decreased imports from Africa (excluding Egypt), according to trade statistics published in the May 1 issue of *Foreign Commerce Weekly*. As a share of total US trade, however, trade with Africa has become slightly smaller. Only 3.2 percent of total US exports went to Africa, roughly the same share as in 1959 and 1958. Moreover, the share of imports from Africa in US total imports is declining, from 4.2 percent in 1958 to 3.8 and 3.4 percent in the two following years.

The value of 1960 exports to Africa was 21.5 percent higher than the 1959 figure. Exports to most of the countries south of the Sahara showed some increase, although there were decreases in the exports to Ethiopia and the Congo (Leopoldville). Over half the increase in exports to this part of Africa was in exports to the Union of South Africa, but the increase in exports to Liberia, Nigeria, and the Canary Islands was also substantial. Although the Union took over half the 1960 exports to Africa south of the Sahara, the relative increase of exports to some of the other countries is more spectacular. Exports to Nigeria and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland rose by 43 percent, and to Liberia by 61 percent. The commodity group contributing most to the increase in exports was machinery (including tractors), which is also the most important category of exports to Africa.

US imports from Africa (excluding Egypt) dropped 12 percent in value from 1959 to 1960. Most of this was in imports from the Congo (Leopoldville), the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Union of South Africa, Ghana, and Angola, only partially offset by significant increases in imports from Nigeria, Ethiopia, and British East Africa. The most important US import from Africa is coffee, but cocoa, rubber, and ferro-alloy and nonferrous ores and metals are also important.

## Morocco Grants Guinea \$2,000,000 Credit for Equipment

Morocco granted a 10-year credit equivalent to \$2,000,000 to Guinea on April 23. The credit, the first to be granted abroad by Morocco, will be used mainly for the purchase of Moroccan equipment.

## American Trade Mission Visits French-Speaking Africa

The first US trade mission to the countries of French-speaking West Africa has been sent by the US Department of Commerce. Six American businessmen and a Department of Commerce leader are visiting Togo, Niger, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, and the Voltaic Republic. They are conducting meetings and panel sessions, visiting plants and plantations, and interviewing local government and business officials. Business proposals from US firms are being presented, and the mission will in turn bring back local businessmen's proposals to US businessmen. The mission plans to complete its tour on June 10.

## Cocoa Price Agreement Under Discussion at Accra

The FAO's International Cocoa Study Group, which met in Accra in April, came closer to agreement on stabilization measures than any of the many preceding meetings on this problem. A drafting committee was appointed to prepare a draft agreement on an export quota system.

After this draft is circulated among the member governments and other interested parties, the Study Group will meet again to consider the various views on the draft. If negotiations appear promising a negotiating conference will be held to establish a stabilization agreement.

The Group also established a committee on consumption to consider an international promotions agency to conduct campaigns aimed at increasing cocoa consumption, to examine the effect of restrictive tariffs and use of substitutes in limiting cocoa consumption, and to promote research on new cocoa products.

The volatile world price of cocoa is especially hard on those countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Brazil, which depend on it as a major source of income. In addition, prices are now depressed because of the oversupply resulting from new plantings, improved disease control measures, and a relatively slower rate of increase in consumption. There has long been talk of a system of cocoa price stabilization by producers, but now the consuming countries are also apparently willing to cooperate in an agreement for the first time. Price stabilization agreements are extremely difficult to establish and maintain for agricultural crops, and cocoa has special additional production complications because it is a tree crop. However, observers now believe that there is a good likelihood of a stabilization scheme for cocoa within a year.

—Norman W. Mosher

# News Review

## All-African Labor Group Forged at Casablanca

Leaders of 45 trade union organizations from nearly all countries in Africa met in the first, long-postponed all-African trade union conference in Casablanca from May 25-30.

The major decisions of the conference—to set up an All-African Trade Union Federation with headquarters in Casablanca and to require all members to sever their ties with other international trade union organizations within 10 months—represented a victory for the more radical faction headed by the Ghana Trades Union Congress and the Guinea National Confederation of Workers. A looser pan-African federation, permitting double affiliation, had been favored by the Tunisian, Kenyan, and Nigerian Representatives, all presently affiliates of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

A moderating position between the two tendencies was reportedly taken by the Moroccan Federation of Labor and by representatives of the Algerian movement.

The charter of the new Federation, adopted by acclamation, calls for "positive neutralism" and decries interference by governments and political parties in trade union affairs.

## KANU Presses Attack On Kenya Government

In Kenya this month, the political prognosis was increasingly somber. Having made major concessions to persuade Ronald Ngala's Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) to set aside its demand for the immediate release of Jomo Kenyatta and form a government, Governor Sir Patrick Renison promptly found himself confronted with a more bitter pro-Kenyatta, anti-government campaign than ever.

The opposition Kenya African National Union, which holds more Legislative Council seats than the governing KADU and is inherently the stronger party, was mobilizing its forces for a concerted campaign to arouse the countryside against the new government by branding it an "agent of colonial administration" disloyal to Kenyatta. Unofficially, KANU leaders described the British decision to work through the minority KADU a "tremendous blunder" which may have robbed Kenya of a peaceful transition to independence.

By mid-May, KANU leaders James Gichuru and Tom Mboya had apparently successfully closed party ranks by regrouping stragglers and settling internal feuds aside and were reorganizing the party into a disciplined, centralized organization capable of operating underground in the

event of an expected ban. In the Legislative Council, KANU's tactic was to introduce motion after motion carefully drafted to place the governing party in the untenable position of having to choose between constant reaffirmations of its support of the colonial administration or, alternatively, matching KANU's demands on Governor Renison.

The London *Times* correspondent concluded his analysis of the unstable Kenya political scene with the observation that "KANU hostility is now so engrained that only one event could induce it to become cooperative again—creation of a single African party under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta." Other observers, noting the widening polarization of the two major parties and the increasingly hostile atmosphere, were far less certain that any kind of a compromise solution was now possible.

## Prime Minister Nyerere Appoints His Cabinet

Julius Nyerere was sworn in as Tanganyika's first Prime Minister on May 1, when the territory achieved full internal self-government—the last intermediate stage before full independence on December 2, 1961. Nine members of his Cabinet (formerly called the Council of Ministers) took the oaths of allegiance and the ministerial affirmation. They were: Sir Ernest Vasey (Finance); Chief Abdulla Fundikira (Legal Affairs); Amir Jamal (Communications, Power and Works); Paul Bomani (Agriculture); Nsilu Swai (Commerce and Industry); Oscar Kambona (Education); Rashidi Kawawa (Minister without Portfolio); Tewa Said Tewa (Lands and Surveys); and J. M. Lusinde (Local Government).

Two Ministers were absent: Derek Bryceson (Health and Labour), who was on an official visit to the United States, and Mr. Kahama (Home Affairs), who was representing the Tanganyika Government at independence celebrations in Sierra Leone.

## K. A. Gbedemah Moved In Ghana Power Shuffle

Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah's April 8 declaration of war on "corruption and backbiting" within the government bureaucracy and the governing Convention People's Party (see *Africa Report*, May 1961, p. 11) had new ramifications this month:

- On May 1, President Nkrumah announced that he would assume the posts of general secretary and chairman of the central committee of the Convention People's Party in an effort to clear up irregularities and "put our house in order."

- Subsequently, the President an-

nounced establishment of a tribunal headed by Sir Charles Tachie-Menson to examine the reports now required of all CPP men in positions of influence on their business interests and assets.

- On May 8, a reshuffling of cabinet responsibilities resulted in the transfer of K. A. Gbedemah, heretofore Ghana's unofficial second-in-command, from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Health and the reassignment of his portfolio as Minister of State for Presidential Affairs to former CPP Secretary General Tawia Adamfo. Another high-ranking official affected was Kojo Botsio, who retained his post as Minister of Agriculture but lost his more important portfolio as Minister of Parliamentary Affairs. The new Finance Minister, F. K. D. Goka, found that his most important department—the Budget Bureau—had been transferred to the Presidential Secretariat.

- In a reversal of an April 8 announcement, Mr. Nkrumah said he had decided against creation of a new Ministry of African Affairs. This function will also be placed under the Presidential Secretariat.

- The Auditor-General, a British subject, has been entrusted with broad new responsibilities to check the accounts of statutory and other bodies handling public funds, including the Trades Union Congress.

## Portuguese Launch New Angola Offensive

Whereas the world's press descended en masse upon the Congo to report, with varying degrees of accuracy, every twist and turn in its troubled first year of independence, only scattered, second-hand reports are available of Africa's major crisis area of 1961. The violence in Angola has now reached a larger scale than any political disturbance in Africa since World War II except Algeria. As the London *Observer* correspondent noted, "This makes the Congo and the Mau Mau revolt look like child's play." These were some of the statistics:

- On May 20, the League of Red Cross Societies in Geneva announced that some 40,000 refugees from Angola had crossed the border into the Congo since fighting broke out between rebel forces and Portuguese troops in February.

- Official Portuguese figures place the number of European deaths at about 1,000, though unofficial reports are much higher. African fatalities have been reported as high as 20,000.

- With the end of the rains in mid-May, reinforced Portuguese troops launched a major offensive against the rebels in northern Angola, but there was no longer certainty in Lisbon

# News Review

that this offensive would succeed. According to South Africa's *Cape Town Times*, Portuguese government authorities have admitted for the first time that they may not be able to put down the revolt.

## Gambia Independence Likely by 1963

Gambia's first constitutional conference, which opened in Bathurst on May 4, recommended that a new constitution should be introduced leading to full internal self-government after general elections. The tiny territory, Britain's last remaining dependency in West Africa, would then progress to independence by two stages of nine months. Delegates to the conference, which was chaired by Minister of State for the Colonies Lord Perth, included representatives of the territory's three main political parties as well as appropriate chiefs and government officials.

If agreement to the recommendations is forthcoming from the Colonial Office, details of the new constitution will probably be worked out in London at a full-dress conference in the fall, and elections will be held by the spring of 1962.

## Coquilhatville Plans 20-State Federation

Throughout the month of May most of the leading political figures of the Congo met in the steamy river town of Coquilhatville to hammer out a mutually acceptable governmental structure. The validity of the decisions reached was placed in some question, however, by the notable absence of two key figures representing opposite ends of the Congolese political spectrum—(1) President Moise Tshombe of secessionist Katanga Province (who was arrested by central government troops on April 24 and has subsequently been detained "up to six months" under an act of internment charging him with 10 offenses ranging from treason to counterfeiting currency), and (2) Antoine Gizenga (who has so far refused to venture out of his stronghold in Orientale Province unless President Joseph Kasavubu recognizes him as the rightful Premier by virtue of his having been Vice-Premier in the original cabinet of the late President Patrice Lumumba).

On May 12, the Coquilhatville conferees nonetheless confidently announced the outline of a proposed constitution for a "Federation of the United States of the Congo," comprising perhaps as many as 20 tribally-based states. These component states would possess considerable autonomy on local matters (including, tentatively, the right to grant minerals concessions), but would turn control of foreign relations, internal security,

and government services over to a strong central government.

Under the presidential system envisaged by the Coquilhatville planners, Mr. Kasavubu would continue as chief of state, and elections would be held possibly by September to elect members of a central unicameral Congress. Mr. Kasavubu announced that he would convene what remains of the Parliament elected in May 1960 into session "within the next few weeks" to seek a vote of confidence on the proposed new constitution. (See "What Cards Does Antoine Gizenga Hold?", p. 2, this issue).

On May 25, the *Times* of India broke the news that Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold's able but controversial special representative in the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal, would resign his post and return to the Indian Foreign Service.

## South African Police Counter Strike Threat

South Africa approached its most heralded celebration of the year—the formal establishment of a republic on May 31—in anything but a festive mood.

Although the government was apparently determined to avoid marring the long-awaited celebrations with the re-establishment of a state of emergency, a heavily-reinforced police force undertook the most widespread police raids in 15 years in an attempt to forestall a threatened nationwide strike by non-white critics of the regime. The strike was called for May 29-31; by May 23, unofficial press reports said that "several thousand" Africans had been arrested.

The first wave of arrests was primarily directed toward the "idler" element among non-whites suspected of "intimidating" or pressuring others to join the strike. The stay-at-home movement has been planned by the African National Action Council, an organization representing the banned African National Congress, in anticipation of an expected failure of the government to accept an ultimatum forwarded to Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd in early May demanding the creation by May 31 of a multiracial national convention charged with drawing up a new, non-racial democratic constitution for South Africa.

Principal organizer of the strike plan has been Nelson Mandela, who went underground in early May to forestall arrest and has been issuing public statements to South African newspapers from public telephone booths and via pamphlets. Albert Luthuli, president of the African National Congress, endorsed the strike plan in an interview with a *New York Times* correspondent on May 11, but his political activities are curtailed because he is now required by

law to restrict his movements to a 15-mile area near his home in Stanger, a small town 50 miles north of Durban.

One of South Africa's two major African political movements, the Pan-Africanist Congress, has reportedly opposed the strike call as a "fruitless gesture" at this particular time, and charged the African National Congress with organizing the movement only as a means of rebuilding its own weakened position vis-a-vis the PAC. The ANC lost ground among non-whites in South Africa last year when it reacted passively to the Sharpeville disturbances and failed to join the Pan-Africanist Congress' strike at that time.

The first President of the Republic of South Africa is the governing Nationalist Party's 67-year old Charles Roberts Swart, former Minister of Justice and Governor General of the Union. In a vote that closely followed party lines, he was named chief-of-state by the South African Parliament by a vote of 139 to 71 on May 10. The opposition United Party candidate was former Chief Justice H. A. Fagan. There are no Africans in the South African Parliament.

## Bechuanaland Capital To Be Transferred

With the departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth, it has been decided that the administrative capital of the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland should be moved from Mafeking, which is actually on South African soil, to a new site within the Protectorate. The new capital city has not been announced, but Lobatsi was the town chosen to convene representatives from all parts of the territory during the third week in May to elect Bechuanaland's first Legislative Council.

Seretse Khama and nine other Africans were selected to sit with 10 European elected members and seven officials in the new Council, to be inaugurated in June. There are some 300,000 Bechuana Africans and 3,000 Europeans in the Protectorate, which is currently undergoing a severe economic crisis because of a drought in its northern sector.

## NPC Sweeps Election In Nigeria's North

To no one's surprise, the Northern People's Congress won 160 of 170 possible seats in Nigeria's Northern Region general election of May 4. The Action Group had nine winning candidates, and one seat went to the NCNC. Votes were cast by 2,250,000 (all men) out of a total register of 3,600,000 in the Region. Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, continues as Prime Minister.

# Four African Views of the Congo Crisis

(Continued from page 6)

as "foreign interference" has contributed to Congolese disorder, it is, in the view of many moderates, a misdemeanor committed by several states and not by Belgium alone.

As to the proper definition of the Congo, the moderates, more than either the radicals or conservatives, have tended to emphasize the legal environment of the problem. Their position has been closer to the radicals than to the conservatives for they have consistently demanded a unified Congo. But this has been the case not so much for reasons of doctrine (radical doctrine concerning the threat of "neo-colonialism" dictates a strong, unitarian regime), but because the law reads that way and because confederation, under the Tana-Senegal formula for example, would end by tearing the country apart. That is to say, when moderates have insisted that "there must be no dismemberment of the Congo," they have tended to link that requirement, not with the problems of "neo-colonialism" or "Balkanization," but with the "rule of law" and the necessity to preserve in law the entity known as the Congo. With the exception of Togo, all have refused to "deal in personalities;" the moderates have remained neutral concerning the struggle for power within the Congo.

## Moderates Support UN

It is with reference to the role of the United Nations that the clearest distinction arises between the moderates on the one hand and the radicals and conservatives on the other. Unlike the two polar positions, the moderates consistently have supported the UN. More and more, the UN operation in the Congo—the UN Force, the Conciliation Commission, and principal staff members of the UN Mission—has depended upon the moderate camp. Even the Sudan, the only moderate to withdraw its troops from the UN Force, said when announcing that withdrawal was in prospect, ". . . we do not mean to imply that the United Nations, led by the Secretary General, is not doing its best."

As to the objectives of the UN, the moderates again have been closer to the radicals than to the conservatives. The UN must support Congolese legal institutions, uphold the territorial integrity of the country, maintain order, and remove foreign military and political personnel not under the UN command. At the point of procedures, however, the radicals and moderates part company. While the radicals have insisted that the UN should be made an adjunct to the legitimate Congolese Government, adding its force to that of the government in

a campaign to unify the country, the moderates have maintained the propriety of an independent position for the United Nations and consistently have opposed the use of force to alter the *status quo*.

More than either the radicals or conservatives, the moderates have been exercised about the general problem of disorder, about the rebellious troops and the repeated lapse of governmental authority in the Congo. Order, or at least the avoidance of civil war, has increasingly been given a higher priority by the moderates than the establishment or the consolidation of some particular regime. To cope with the problem of disorder, the moderates have urged strengthening the UN mandate. A corollary problem has been that of relating the authority of the UN to the prerogatives of the sovereign Republic of the Congo.

Togo has suggested that the UN must become the "sole authority responsible for maintaining law and order." Other moderates have warned that the UN must under no circumstances establish a "trusteeship" over the Congo. Yet all the moderates have advocated an expansion of UN authority and have pressed for UN involvement in such tasks as "disarming" the army or "insulating it from politics"—tasks that surely imply certain governmental prerogatives for the UN Congo mission.

In short, the moderates have been the UN enthusiasts in the Congo. Anything less than an expanded mandate for the UN, they have argued, would perpetuate chaos and create a beachhead for great power (or small power) intervention. The terse cable of Togo's President Olympio to the Secretary General on the occasion of Lumumba's death sums up the moderate view: "Struggle for influence carried on in Congo by African and non-African States must end . . . All assistance by States Members United Nations must be channelled through United Nations, only body which cannot be accused of political or other designs on Congo."

## IV. Ghana's Deviant Position

Of all the deviations from the "core" positions described above, that of Ghana is by all odds the most important and deserves a special word.

Ghana is fully in harmony with the radical position concerning the peril of neo-colonialism and the requirements of an effective response to that danger. "In my view," said President Nkrumah to the Ghanaian National Assembly on August 8, 1960, "any person who talks of a federal type of constitution for the Congo is a supporter of the imperialist cause." On September 24, 1960, shortly after

the Kasavubu-Lumumba split and the Mobutu coup d'état, President Nkrumah told the UN General Assembly that the point had been reached "where [UN] intervention on the side of the legitimate government of the Congo appears to be the obvious and only answer to the crisis . . ." Indeed, Ghana's open and covert support to Lumumba was unstinting throughout the greater part of the fall.

However, as opposed to Guinea, Mali, and the UAR, Ghana frequently has exercised a restraining influence on radical attempts to terminate UN action in favor of direct intervention. In this respect, it has aligned itself with the moderates.

## Ghana's Troops Remain

At the conference of independent African states in Leopoldville in August, Lumumba's call for an all-African army received support from Guinea and the UAR—but not from Ghana. At the Casablanca conference in January, Guinea, Mali, and the UAR reportedly wanted to make their UN contingents directly available to Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's political heir. Ghana, with Morocco, resisted the idea. While all the other radicals have withdrawn their units from the UN Force, Ghana's troops still serve in the Congo. Whereas Guinea, Mali, and the UAR left the UN Conciliation Commission, Ghana, again with Morocco, remained aboard, though it refused to endorse the Commission's final report.

With the radicals, Ghana has kept one eye on the threat of neo-colonialism; but, with the moderates, it has kept the other eye on the danger of the Cold War. Direct aid to the Congo, said Ghana's Ambassador to the UN Alex Quaison-Sackey on September 16, "would definitely have the most serious repercussions."

Ghana's formula for combining these incompatibles—multilateralism to guard against East-West intervention and vigorous support of the nationalist regime to defeat the "neo-colonial plot"—has been the repeated demand for Africanization of the UN Command and Force. On September 24, President Nkrumah asked the General Assembly to delegate UN functions in the Congo to the independent African states, "especially those . . . whose contributions in men and material make the United Nations effort in the Congo possible." In his plan of February 18, Ghana's Chief of State urged that an all-African command "should take over complete responsibility for law and order in the Congo." (On March 7, he said the Command and Force should be "primarily African.") All foreign diplomatic missions, he added, ought

(Continued on page 15)

# Congo Independence Revisited

By HARVEY GLICKMAN  
(Book Editor)

**Congo: Background of Conflict**, by Alan P. Merriam (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961), 368 pages, \$6.

**Congo Disaster**, by Colin Legum (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), 174 pages, 85¢.

**The Congo, A Brief History and Appraisal**, by Maurice N. Hennessy (New York: Praeger, 1961), 148 pages, \$3.50.

**Chronique de Politique Etrangere ("La Crise Congolaise")** v. 13, nos. 4-6, July-November 1960: "Le Congo et les Problèmes de la Décolonisation," by Fernand Van Langenhove; "87 Documents Concernant la Crise Congolaise." (Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales), 611 pages, 300 francs.

American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, Central and Southern Africa Series, v. 8, nos. 1-3, August and September 1960: "Conflict in the Congo," by Edwin S. Munger (New York: American Universities Field Staff), 45 pages.

These works doubtless represent only the beginning of a spate of explanations of the Congo crisis. Although it is too early for definitive analysis or for profound appreciation of the "meaning" of the events of the past few years, a concerned and troubled public welcomes these first attempts to delineate the forces in conflict.

Each of the authors has tried to place the "disaster" in the perspective of the Congo's history—European exploration, Leopold's acquisition, a legacy of brutality, Belgian paternalism and the recent stirrings of nationalism. Naturally the depth of coverage varies with space allotments, but in general all agree that Belgian policy-makers tragically misjudged the needs and demands of the middle of the twentieth century and neglected political development for too long.

The brief essay by Professor Van Langenhove, as might be expected from a former Belgian delegate to the UN, is most charitable. He prefers to see political upheaval in the Congo as another instance in the march of nationalism over Africa. The Belgians appear relatively helpless against outside forces—unfortunately they were charged with administering peoples "less advanced" than in other colonies. Professor Van Langenhove wistfully contrasts Congolese politicians with a Nkrumah or a Houphouet-Boigny!

Mr. Hennessy, a British journalist with some service in West Africa, has pulled together some passable history,

but he is less than illuminating on the crucial developments after 1959. An air of conspiracy pervades his interpretations. For instance, he implies a kind of moral betrayal in the role of the Church as collaborator with government in educational policy. In addition he regards Lumumba as a Communist plot—more precisely, he views Lumumba's ascent to power as part of a carefully planned scheme that included help from the USSR. Fortunately, the discriminating reader can compare a discussion of the evidence—a "secret" document addressed to Bakusu tribesmen—with the full translation and analysis in the AUFS Report by Dr. Munger. The latter's suggestion that the document is a forgery perpetrated by a few fanatic *colons* appears persuasive.



In line with the policy of the American Universities Field Staff, the articles by Dr. Munger (regular AUFS correspondent in Africa) result from on-the-spot interviews and observation. While the author is concerned mainly with the immediate reasons for and the facts of the mutiny of the *Force Publique*, he provides extended commentary on the position of the Belgian population in the Congo. Somewhat surprisingly, he notes, ". . . race relations have long been worse in the Congo than anywhere else in the world"—"guilt" and "sex" account for mass hysteria on the part of the Belgians in the face of molestations. At the critical moment before independence, apparently, the Congo Belgians were not kept fully informed by the home government.

The works by Mr. Legum, Africa correspondent of the London *Observer*, and by Professor Merriam, an anthropologist at Northwestern, neatly complement one another. Merriam has concentrated on the internal factors leading to political failure and the breakdown of authority, examining in detail the development of pressures for change in Belgian policy. He suggests that even before 1960, "the Congo was becoming an unprofitable undertaking." Thirty-one Congolese parties and their leaders are described and sorted out, elections are analyzed; and the tortuous course of negotiations between the Belgian Government and the Congolese leaders

is recounted. From the evidence advanced, a reasonable case could be made for a wider consensus among Congolese leaders on the need for a confederal state than has been emphasized heretofore.

Legum, on the other hand, has benefited from the ability of his publisher to hold the presses until December 1960, which permits him to reduce the crisis to "phases"—Belgian conflict with the Congolese, UN intervention, expansion into an incident in the Cold War, Congolese reaction, and so on. He is particularly skillful in weaving together the external aspects of the situation, although some of his judgments may be based on sketchy evidence. For example, he deduces an American stake in the Congo from the grandiose scheme for economic development sold by Mr. Edgar Detwiler to Prime Minister Lumumba! More seriously, although he concludes that the "successes" of the UN "overshadow all its weaknesses and failures," he leaves the impression that the UN political operation has been a monstrosity and that it can be blamed—if only indirectly—for permitting the collapse of the Lumumba government. Legum's argument is that the UN failed to disarm the *Force Publique*, failed to help re-establish central control over Katanga, and promiscuously extended the doctrine of "non-intervention" to allow "illegal" acts against the central government. (At a critical stage, this had the effect of favoring Kasavubu over Lumumba, e.g. vide the affair of the Leopoldville radio station at the time of the mutual dismissals from office.)

## "Tragic Figure" Emerges

Lumumba himself emerges as a tragic figure, desperately trying to breathe the fire of Nkrumah-like nationalism into an odd assortment of allies and followers. It is useful to be reminded that Lumumba appealed for aid to the Russians only after he had been disappointed by the United States, the Afro-Asian states, and then the African states.

Readers who enjoy lively surveys of international conflicts that "make sense" of disparate interests and events will find great rewards in the treatment by Legum. With broad strokes he draws a picture of an irresponsible Belgian administration, concerned for the welfare of the Congolese—perhaps—but overconfident, isolated, and overcome with power and profit. The crowning misjudgment is symbolized by Legum's quotation from General Janssens, Commander-in-Chief of the *Force Publique* on July 4, 1960. "The *Force Publique*? It is my creation. It is absolutely loyal. I have made my dis-

positions." Legum's indictment represents the classic case of officialdom victimized by its own propaganda.

Professor Merriam, true to his calling and though forced to rely sometimes on an indiscriminate variety of sources, offers a more dispassionate account, but he is not neutral when it comes to giving the reader the benefit of his judgment. While critical of Belgian tactics, he is compassionate about their difficulties. And while he clearly sympathizes with the aims and efforts of the Congolese, he is not inhibited from indicating inconsistencies in their behavior. Perhaps the most fascinating parts of the work are the two chapters narrating reactions to impending independence in a village in Kasai (where Merriam and his wife did field research in 1959-60) and in Stanleyville. They underline the confusion and lack of planning that accompanied the arrival of independence; order and authority had melted away some time before July 1960.

Although a host of emergent implications can be cited, perhaps two general ones remain clearest. How extraordinarily peaceful have been the "normal" transfers of power in Africa, relative to what might have been! With the added perspective that time will grant, it is possible that the Congo will be seen as an unfortunate exception to the main thrust of developments on the continent. More disturbing, however, is that—"exceptional" or not—Congolese politics have served to deepen the divisions among African states. Again, only time will tell whether the Congo crisis acted as a watershed in the story of pan-Africanism.

**Tanganyika and International Trusteeship**, by B. T. G. Chidzero (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 286 pages, \$6.10.

To take its place alongside several analyses of the role of the Trusteeship system in general, Dr. Chidzero ("a Rhodesian of African descent" now with the Economic Commission for Africa) offers a case study of Tanganyika. He is concerned with the effect that international supervision has had on the development of British policy and one is tempted to state that this is the definitive work as far as this aspect of the administration of Tanganyika is concerned. The book is balanced, comprehensive, and painstakingly researched.

The author does not merely conclude that trust status has generally affected British policy. This has been noted before and is obvious in the nature of a situation which permits international discussion of a single country's administration. Instead, Dr. Chidzero appraises four policy areas: closer union with other territories of British East Africa, progress toward self-government, the development of a peaceful multi-racial society, and land alienation. With the possible exception of the first area, trust status

can be shown to have spurred the British along a path they might not have taken on their own, or, in any case, along which they would have proceeded with less alacrity.

The findings on the question of closer union, however, suggest that credit must not be totally denied to British aims and to the sense of duty of the top territorial officials. In the inter-war years, as Dr. Chidzero emphasizes, closer union might have been acceptable to the British Government at home "if it was accompanied by an entrenchment of the Imperial Government's position as arbiter." To this the settlers could not agree. This was also the price that officials like Sir Donald Cameron would have exacted from the settlers, though he felt that any talk of union deserted the spirit of the Mandate and, significantly, the spirit of British "trusteeship" for native peoples. The author admits this, but he points to the Central African Federation and doubts whether it could have come about if one of the territories had International Trust status.

In the other cases the author leaves no doubt that the international trust status acted to further the position of the nationalist movement and to the detriment of the aims of the small number of European settlers, who might have gone some way toward establishing a political elite if they had been left to their own devices in an ordinary British colony. Wisely, too much is not claimed for the Trusteeship Council and its administrative arms. Dr. Chidzero concludes, "It is this promotive or catalytic aspect of the trusteeship and this balancing of forces which together constitute the important thing . . ."

The key point may lie, however, in the fact that it is the British with whom the Trusteeship Council is dealing. And here perhaps its major significance is that it has "reinforced the liberal forces within British policy-making circles." One is left to wonder what Dr. Chidzero's assessment would be if he considered South West Africa instead of Tanganyika? Might it not be even more embarrassing if America's Pacific territories were examined?

#### NOTES:

1. Occasionally this department will draw attention to articles deemed noteworthy and of general interest in monthly, quarterly and semi-annual journals devoted to African affairs. The following have appeared recently:

\* In Africa: *Mary H. Hystad*, "Paintings of Ghanaian Children," v. 30, July 1960—In examining paintings as indicators of values, it is found that they are generally "traditional," in contrast to modernizing environment, raising problems "regarding the rate of social change" and "the stability and satisfaction which still accrue from traditional

patterns." *Dennis Austin*, "Elections in an African Rural Area," v. 31, January 1961—Though dated, the evidence indicates conditions not unlike those which existed in England or the US in the nineteenth century, with money, favors, and personalities playing a predominant role.

\* In Human Problems in British Central Africa: *David Bettison*, "Factors in the Determination of Wage Rates in Central Africa," nos. 27 and 28, June and December 1960—While the money economy of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has grown, real wages for Africans have not gone up, leading to the conclusion that wage rates are fixed in a "social framework" of racial divisions and the need for economic cooperation; reorganization of wage relationships demands a new set of race relationships.

\* In The Journal of African Administration: *Marion Foon*, "Operation Ping Pong to Beat Vote Fiddlers," v. 13, January 1961—A fool-proof method was devised to prevent election frauds in the first Protectorate-wide poll in Gambia in May 1960, which involved special balls inserted by voters into pipes which rang a bell in a drum. *J. H. M. Beattie*, "Bunyoro Through the Looking Glass," v. 12, April 1960—A study of the decline of morale among the Banyoro, who glorify the past and denigrate the present, adding up to alienation from European and native rulers.

\* In Africa South in Exile: *Sanjit S. Heyer*, "The Asian in Kenya," v. 5, January-March 1961—A survey of political problems, pointing out that the majority of Asians are not traders, but public and private employees, making their position even more precarious. *Roy Ferrott*, "The Public Relations of Africa," *ibid.*—A description of the activities of various London firms hired by several African governments.

\* In African Affairs: *Harry F. Oppenheimer*, "South Africa's Role in Changing Africa," v. 59, January 1961—Asks for a qualified franchise for all, concluding that "a stable political system must correspond with the facts of power."

\* In The Journal of African History: *George Shepperson*, "Notes on Negro American Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism," v. 1, No. 2, 1960—A review of sources and materials, emphasizing that Negro Americans have played a considerable role.

2. Staff Problems in Tropical and Subtropical Countries, Report of the 32nd Incidi Study Session, 1960 (Brussels: Institut International des Civilisations Differentes, 1961), 681 pages, n.p.

A set of papers, resolutions and reports of discussions about problems of individual countries. The authors in-

clude James Coleman, George Balandier and Charles Ammann.

3. **The Rich and the Poor**, by Robert Theobald (NY: New American Library, 1961), 160 pages, 50¢.

"A study of the economics of rising expectations" that combines economic with anthropological analysis to develop a program of aid to underdeveloped countries. The author spends some time demolishing traditional economic and political assumptions and contends that independent economic growth in already advanced nations may hinder, rather than help the world problem. A stimulating work of popularization.

4. **The White Nile**, by Alan Moorehead (NY: Harper, 1960), 385 pages, \$5.95.

Possibly the most enthralling book on Africa in recent years; a story of astonishing courage, fierce resolution, and terrific faith among explorers, exploiters, and fighters in East Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century. Writing flawlessly, the author revivifies the great era of British imperialism in a way that makes intelligible the objectives and behavior of its protagonists. Stanley and Livingstone, in particular, are gloriously rescued from their received images as figures of ridicule and of pity, respectively. This is history in the Shakespeare style, the tales constructed around the lives of heroes—the names spatter forth like a drum roll—Burton, Speke, Gordon, Kitchener, Emin Pasha. They all struggled to "civilize" Africa, although they probably only furthered Africa's brutalization. Can anyone deny that this tragic problem of idealism has left us?

5. **Search for Security, An Ethno-psychiatric Study of Rural Ghana**, by M. J. Field (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1960), 478 pages, \$6.50.

Although much of this book will interest only anthropologists and psychiatrists, it is significant enough to command general attention. Dr. Field is concerned with mental illness, its symptoms and its origins among a small group of rural Ashanti. Activity centers around "shrines" where priests in fits of possession dispense "medicine" to supplicants in various

stages of anxiety. The hundred-odd case studies are fascinating, though austere presented. The worries of these Ashanti resemble the worries of people we all know and it would seem that Dr. Field has succeeded in disproving "the idea that mental stress and mental illness are the prerogative of over-civilized societies."

6. **Africa A to Z**, by Robert S. Kane (NY: Doubleday, 1961), 408 pages, \$4.95.

A windfall from Africa's recent emergence on the world scene is that most prospective tourists have been introduced to the continent via political reporting. This means that the tourist guidebooks must be slightly more sophisticated than their European forebears. Mr. Kane's book fills this new bill admirably and it is a pleasure to read travel advice that finally says something about social problems, as well as purveying useful tips on such items as the number of pairs of pajamas needed (one). Includes North Africa.

## Four African Views Of The Congo Crisis

(Continued from page 12)

to leave the country. (Ghana's ambassador to Leopoldville had been declared *persona non grata* the previous November.) Finally, the UN Command should disarm and retrain the Congolese Army, using force if necessary; should release political prisoners; and should convene Parliament under UN auspices.

This is tantamount to an advanced form of UN trusteeship and has obvious similarities with the moderates' advocacy of a strengthened UN mandate. But the Nkrumah plan would have Africans in full control, with the hope, no doubt, of enhancing the influence of the radicals in the conduct of UN affairs in the Congo.

• • •  
How significant are these differing attitudes on the basic issues in the Congo crisis? It is easy to exaggerate. Positions are in fact being moderated as the protracted conflict drags on. In the last round of votes in the General Assembly on April 15, radicals, moderates, and conservatives found them-

selves in the same camp respecting many of the proposals. Hard-core radicals and many conservatives, for example, agreed that Belgian political and military personnel must leave the Congo. Conservatives, who heretofore had insisted that the UN keep "hands off" the Congo, supported a UN resolution advocating the convening of Parliament and the formation of a national government. Conservatives and moderates recently met in Monrovia and "reaffirmed faith in the United Nations as the organization best adapted to achieve a real solution of the Congo problem."

The politics of postcolonial Africa are fluid. Positions are forming but they are not fixed. Only the position of the extreme radicals has substantial ideological content. The others are flexible and subject to change—some of them, we may be sure, to violent change.

At the same time, conservative, moderate, and radical tendencies are reflections of basic suppositions concerning the very nature of postcolonial politics: how to organize the postcolonial state; how to relate that state to the former metropole; how to effect a new system of international order to take the place of the now defunct colonial order. On these issues there are cleavages—some of them serious and deep.

In a speech before the General Assembly in the middle of April, Jaja Wachuku, head of the Conciliation Commission to the Congo and leader of the Nigerian delegation to the UN, noted the existence of the three groups of African powers. "In the end," he said, "none of the three are Powers at all. A house divided against itself cannot be effective . . . If we are going to speak effectively and act effectively in the United Nations, this is the time, because to the African states the Congo is a challenge . . . We are responsible for whatever happens. I will not blame what you call the East or the West."

The Congo is indeed a challenge to the new states of Africa. There will be many more challenges before long. Whether the house will irreversibly divide against itself or unite in effective action, none can say for sure. But Wachuku is surely right. Primary responsibility resides now in African hands.

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# Visitors

Three Sierra Leone Government Ministers are in the US until late June on State Department leader grants. They are: ALBERT MARGAI, Minister of Natural Resources; ROBERT G. O. KING, Minister of State for Economic Development; and MOHAMMAD SANUSI MUSTAPHA, Minister of Finance. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

SIMON KAPWEPWE, Treasurer General of Northern Rhodesia's United National Independence Party, in the US until early July on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

MANASSE YAO JIMINIGA, Secretary of the Togo Ministry of Agriculture, in the US until early September on a State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

Lady AYODELE ALAKIJA, National Secretary of the Young Women's Christian Association of Nigeria, in the US until early July on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

MOUSTAPHA CISSE, member of the Senegalese Parliament for the *Union Progressiste Senegalaise* and Mayor of Louga, in the US until late July on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

DEMBA DIOP, Member of the Senegalese Parliament for the *Union Progressiste Senegalaise*, in the US until late July on a US State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

Five Ethiopians, in the US until late July on State Department specialist grants: GIRMA AMARE, Dean of Students at University College of Addis Ababa; MENGECHA G. HIWET, Director of the University College of Addis Ababa Extension Department; ELIAS PETROS, Publicity Department of the Ministry of Information; BELETA TEDLA, Translator for the Amharic Section of an Ethiopian daily newspaper; and ZAWDIE RETTA, Director of the Amharic Section of the Voice of Ethiopia, and of the English and Amharic monthly magazine *Menen*. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

MARIE SIVOMEY, Assistant Secretary General of the *Union des Femmes du Togo* (UFEMTO), in the US until early July on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

UDO UDO OKURE, Commissioner of the Eastern Nigerian Public Service Commission, in the US until late June on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

NANAMALE GBEGBENI, Member of the Togo Chamber of Deputies, in the US until early July on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

DIRK GYSBERT RICHARD, Chief of Publications of the Afrikaanse Press Ltd., Union of South Africa, in the US until late July on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

# Calendar

June 15-16: "Cooperative Development and Exchange", a symposium to be held at the Center for International Visitors Commercial Museum, 34th Street and Convention Avenue, Philadelphia, under the Sponsorship of the United Friends of Africa, Inc., 1968 Sparks Street, Philadelphia 41, Pennsylvania.

"The Traditional Arts of Africa's New Nations", an exhibit on display at the Museum of Primitive Art, 15 West 54th Street, New York City.

June 17: Conference of the Greater Hartford People to People Council, to discuss various problems of African countries, in Hartford, Connecticut. For details, write Thomas R. Ford, Greater Hartford People to People Council, Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., Hartford.

June 19-23: Biennial National Convention of the American Association of University Women, to discuss "Today's World and Our Purpose." Chukwemeka Isagwu of the Nigerian Mission to the United Nations will be among the speakers at a session to be held June 20 on US policy toward Africa. For details, contact Dorothy Robins, AAUW, 2401 Virginia Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

August 2-4: "Colloquium on Africa," a conference to be held at Georgetown University. Participants include Governor G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; Senator Gale McGee (D) Wyoming; E. M. Debrah, Counselor of the Ghana Embassy; Harvey Glickman, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Haverford College; John Marcum, Professor of Political Science at Colgate University; and Mark Karp, Professor of African Studies at Boston University. For details, contact Dr. William H. Lewis, Conference Chairman, Department of History, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

September 11-15: Conference on "Communications and Political Development in the New Countries," sponsored by the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics, to be held at Gould House, Dobbs Ferry, New York. Attendance by invitation. For details, write Professor Lucien Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

A collection of African Children's paintings from the Cyrene Mission and Canon Paterson's African Art School in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, is on loan by its owner, Mrs. Harold Hochschild, to the American Federation of Arts, 1083 Fifth Avenue, New York City. It is available from the Federation at nominal rentals for exhibition in schools and museums.

